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Strategies for Preserving the Bankruptcy
Trustee's Avoidance Power Against States After Seminole Tribe
TED JANGER*
States often assert claims in private bankruptcies, sometimes for taxes,
but often for other debts as well. Congress has twice made it clear that it
intends states in their capacity as creditors, to be subject to the jurisdiction
of Federal Bankruptcy Courts, and to the substantive provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code as well. Twice, however, the Supreme Court has stood
in the way. In 1978, when Congress enacted § 106 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code (the Code),' which sought to waive sovereign immunity
on behalf of the states, the Supreme Court held, in Hoffman v. Connecticut
Department of Income Maintenance,2 that Congress had not stated its
intention to "abrogate" state's sovereign immunity with sufficient clarity.
When, in the Banl ruptcy Amendments of 1994, 3 Congress responded to the
Court's invitation by amending § 106 to meet the Supreme Court's "clear
statement" requirement,4 the Supreme Court again stood in the way. The
* © 1997, Edward J. Janger.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
2. 492 U.S. 96 (1989). In United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992), the
Supreme Court further held that § 106 did not operate to waive federal sovereign immunity.
3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 702(b)(2)(B), 108 Stat. 4106, 4150
(1994).
4. The legislative history specifically states Congress's intention to legislatively overrule the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute. Indeed, to underline its position, Congress made the
amendments to § 106 retroactive:
Section 113. Sovereign Immunity
This section would effectively overrule two Supreme Court cases that have held that the
States and Federal Government are not deemed to have waived their sovereign immunity by
virtue of enacting section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. In enacting § 106(c), Congress
intended to make provisions of title 11 that encompassed the words "creditor," "entity" or
"governmental unit" applicable to the States. Congress also intended to make the States
subject to a money judgment. But the Supreme Court in Hoffman ... held that even if the
State did not file a claim, the trustee in bankruptcy may not recover a money judgment from
the State notwithstanding section 106(c). This holding had the effect of providing that
preferences could not be recovered from the States. In using such narrow construction, the
Court held that use of the "trigger words" would only bind the States, and not make them
subject to a money judgment. The Court did not find in the text of the statute an
"unmistakenly clear" intent of Congress to waive sovereign immunity in accordance with the
language promulgated in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon ....
The Court applied this reasoning in United States v. Nordic Village... in not allowing
a trustee to recover a postpetition payment by a chapter 11 debtor to the Internal Revenue
Service. The Court found that there was no such waiver expressly provided within the text
of the statute.
This amendment expressly provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity by
governmental units with respect to monetary recoveries as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief. It is the Committee's intent to make § 106 conform to the Congressional intent of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 waiving the sovereign immunity of the States and the
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Supreme Court's recent holding in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,5 that private
citizens may not sue states in federal court to enforce federally created
rights, appears to overrule amended § 106, at least in part.6
In this essay I hope to do three things. First, I will sketch, in a non-
technical way, the likely effect of Seminole Tribe on bankruptcy practice
generally and on § 106 in particular. Second, I will suggest a number of
possible statutory solutions which might subject states to federal bankruptcy
law by recasting private enforcement actions against states as suits by the
Federal Government, and articulate some principals which might help to
determine how federal is federal enough. And, third, I will suggest that
prosecutorial discretion, and possible conflicts of interest between the
government and the bankruptcy trustee will likely impair the effectiveness
of any solution that actually passes constitutional muster.
I. How DOES SEMIvOLE TRIBE AFFECT BAMKRUPTCY LAW?.
A. Bankruptcy Law in a Nutshell
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code creates an
estate consisting of all of the assets of a debtor,7 and a Trustee in
Bankruptcy (TEB) is given the status of a hypothetical lien creditor with a
lien on all of the debtor's assets as of the date of the petition.8 The
Federal Government in this regard.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at42 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,3350-51 (citations omitted).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
6. Seminole Tribe involved legislation under the Indian Commerce Clause, and Union Gas
involved legislation under the Commerce Clause. Neither case involved legislation under the bankruptcy
clause. However, one of the post Union Gas cases expressly criticized by the majority is In re
Merchants Grain, Inc., 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995), a bankruptcy case involving a preference action
under II U.S.C. § 547. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded that case at the same time that it
decided Seminole Tribe. While the Court has not expressly held that the same rle applies in bankruptcy
proceedings, a number of lower courts have so held. Sparkman v. Department of Revenue (In re York-
Hanover Dev., Inc.), 201 B.R. 137 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1996) (fraudulent conveyance action brought by
TIB against Florida Department of Revenue barred by the Eleventh Amendment); In re Martinez, 196
B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1996) (Eleventh Amendment bars action by TIB seeking money damages for
violation of automatic stay). While conceding that Seminole Tribe applies, a number of other courts have
held that a state waives its sovereign immunity when it files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy action.
Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 200 B.R. 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); see also Headrick v. Georgia (In
re Headrick), 200 B.R. 963, 968 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). Indeed, at least one court has argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment creates a private right of action for violations of automatic stay. Headrick, 200
B.R. at 967 ("Article I empowers Congress to grant debtors the privileges and immunities of the
Bankruptcy Code, and the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the right to enforce those privileges
and immunities by creating private rights of action against the States.").
7. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994).
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automatic stay goes into effect at the moment the petition is filed, and
prohibits individual creditors from seeking to collect their debts by unilateral
action.' In addition, the Federal Bankruptcy Code creates a number of
federal rights of action, and vests enforcement power in the TIB. These
causes of action include actions to avoid preferences' ° and fraudulent
conveyances," and actions to avoid unperfected liens. 2 Once avoidance
actions have been brought, claims allowed or disallowed, and the assets
distributed, the court discharges all prepetition debts, 3 and the discharge
injunction goes into effect, barring any creditors from seeking to collect on
any debts discharged by the bankruptcy. 4
B. The Effect of Seminole Tribe
For the purposes of this discussion, two aspects of federal bankruptcy
law are thus important: (1) the Court's power to enjoin state collection
efforts pursuant to the automatic stay and discharge injunction, 5 and (2)
the TIB's power to recover money from states pursuant to its various
avoidance powers. To understand these two contexts, it might be useful to
keep two stories in mind: The "injunction story" and the "avoidance story."
First, the injunction story: Frank Ponzi runs an investment company
called Ponzi Investments in the State of Virginia. The company owes
$1,000,000 in back taxes to the State of Virginia. As it turns out, Frank is
not a very smart stock picker, or very honest, and he loses all of his
investor's money and then some. The company files for bankruptcy. At the
moment of the filing, the automatic stay goes into effect, and prohibits
individual creditors, including states, from seeking to collect their debts by
unilateral action.' 6
Second, the avoidance story: As it turns out, Ponzi also had a $200,000
personal state tax liability. Shortly before Ponzi Investments filed for
bankruptcy, Ponzi raided the corporate bank account and used the money to
pay his personal state income taxes.'7 Here, the Federal Bankruptcy Code
creates a number of federal rights of action, and vests enforcement power
9. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 544.
13. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1328 (1994).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), (3) (1994).
15. In addition to the automatic stay and discharge injunctions, the court may issue such other
injunctions as are necessary to administer a bankruptcy case pursuant to II U.S.C. § 105.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994).
17. These facts are loosely modeled on LI.S. v. Nordic Village, except that the tax liability in
Nordic Village was to the federal rather than state government, and the transfer occurred post-petition.
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in the TIB. These causes of action include actions to avoid preferences 8
and fraudulent conveyances, 9 each of which would, pre-Seminole Tribe,
give the TIB the power to recover the $200,000 from the state.
1. Seminole Tribe and the Bankruptcy Court's Injunction Power
Seminole Tribe will have little effect on the injunction story. Even
after Seminole Tribe, the automatic stay will prevent state officials from
seizing the assets of Ponzi Investments. While states themselves are
immune from suit under Seminole Tribe, Bankruptcy Court injunctions bind
state officials acting in their official capacity. Under Ex parte Young,
20
such officials are not immune, and state officials who violate the automatic
stay can be held in contempt. While, in Seminole Tribe, the Court declared
that no "Ex parte Young" type injunction was available under the Indian
Gaming Act, this was a holding based on statutory interpretation, rather than
constitutional limitation. In the Court's view, Congress enacted a detailed
remedial scheme when it enacted the Indian Gaming Act, and that this
remedial scheme did not include the power to enjoin state officials.
However, the Court expressly stated, albeit in footnote, that such an action
would have been available if Congress had intended to create it.2'
The Bankruptcy Code differs from the Indian Gaming Act in this
regard. Congress has expressly created an injunction power,2 2 and has
expressed its intention that it apply against states.23 Unless the Supreme
Court goes further than it did in Seminole Tribe, the automatic stay and the
discharge injunction should continue to bind state officials.
2. Avoidance Actions After Seminole Tribe
More troubling is the effect of Seminole Tribe on the avoidance powers
of the TIB. After Seminole Tribe, the trustee of Ponzi Investments will not
be able to recover the money Frank Ponzi stole from the company and
handed over the to the state to pay his personal taxes. While the
Bankruptcy Court can prevent state action in the future, here an Ex parte
Young type injunction will do no good. The state has the money, or the
18. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
20. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1133 n.17 (1996) ("Contrary to the claims of the
dissent, we do not hold that Congress cannot authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young over
a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme. We find only that Congress did not intend that result
in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act").
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 524 (1994).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
1434 [Vol. 23
STRATEGIES
asset, and the Trustee wants to sue to get it back. Prior to Seminole Tribe
this transfer would have been avoidable as either a preference24 or as a
fraudulent conveyance." However, if the TIB is viewed as a private
citizen suing a state, then under Seminole Tribe the Eleventh Amendment
would appear to bar the suit. Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to take this
view as well. The majority opinion in Seminole Tribe expressly criticizes
the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Merchants Grain, Inc.,26 a
bankruptcy case involving a preference action under 11 U.S.C. § 547, and,
in a companion case, summarily vacated that decision and remanded.27 To
the extent that courts have explored this question since Seminole Tribe they
have, with one exception, concluded that Seminole Tribe disposes of any
avoidance actions against states.2" On this reading, for the reasons
discussed above, Seminole Tribe clearly fiustrates congressional intent.
C. Distinguishing Seminole Tribe-Strategies Available Under
Current Law
This analysis raises two questions. First, in the near term, what can a
TIB's lawyer do under current law to defeat a motion to dismiss when suing
a state to recover a preference? Second (and discussed in the next part),
what can Congress do to have its cake and eat it too? Is there a way to
amend the Bankruptcy Code to satisfy the requirements of the Eleventh
Amendment while allowing the TfB to recover preferences from states?
There are three Seminole Tribe evading strategies currently being
explored by the courts:
1. Waiver
The first of these strategies is waiver. Section 106 provides that where
a state or state agency files a proof of claim and seeks to participate in the
24. II U.S.C. § 547 (1994).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994).
26. 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995).
27. 116 S. Ct. 1411 (1996).
28. Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Welfare, 204 B.R. 132 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997);
In re Martinez, 196 B.R 225 (Bankr. D. P.R. 1996); Sparkman (In re York-Hannover Devs., Inc.) v.
Florida Dep't of Revenue, 201 B.R. 137 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 1996) (fraudulent conveyance action brought
by TIB against Florida Department of Revenue barred by the Eleventh Amendment). One court has
suggested that an action for money damages might be available under the Fourteenth Amendment for
violations of the automatic stay. Headrick v. Georgia, 200 B.R. 963, 967 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996)
("Article I empowers Congress to grant debtors the privileges and immunities of the Bankruptcy Code,
and the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the right to enforce those privileges and immunities by
creating private rights of action against the States.").
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bankruptcy, it waives sovereign immunity. Courts since Seminole Tribe
have not found this constitutionally problematic.29 Some questions remain,
however, as to the scope of that waiver. Can that waiver constitutionally
extend only to claims in recoupment, or can it extend to setoffs based on
other causes of action? 0 Does the waiver allow the TIB to bring claims
for amounts in excess of the amount claimed by the state?3 Does waiver
by one state agency constitute waiver by the entire state?32
A second set of questions arise as to what it takes for a state to waive
sovereign immunity. Under the current version of § 106(b) waiver only
occurs when the state files a proof of claim.33 However, under original
version of § 106, courts had held that a state might waive merely by seeking
to participate in a bankruptcy distribution without filing a proof of claim.
While insufficient under the current version of the statute, it might be
constitutionally sufficient for conduct short of filing a claim to constitute
waiver. For example, seizing assets of the state post-petition, or even
(though not likely) seeking and accepting a preference in anticipation of a
bankruptcy filing, might be deemed constitutionally sufficient manifestations
of an intention to waive sovereign immunity.34 Indeed, during the period
between the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman and the 1994
amendments many courts pressed the limits of waiver, and the limits of the
statutory language.35  Section 106 could be amended to allow these
theories to reemerge.
2. State Court Actions to Enforce Federal Rights
Even where a state has not waived its sovereign immunity by filing a
proof of claim, Professor Elizabeth Gibson has argued that it may still be
29. Burke v. Georgia (In re Burke), 200 B.IL 282 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); Headrick v. Georgia
(In re Headrick), 200 B.R 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
30. Under 11 U.S.C. § 106(b), (c), by filing a proof of claim, a governmental unit waives
sovereign immunity with regard to any claims against the state which arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence, presumably, even if the counterclaim might result in an affirmative recovery against the
state. In addition, the governmental unit is subject to claims of setoff against its claim regardless of
whether they arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.
31. See II U.S.C. § 106(b), (c) (1994).
32. See Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.),
204 B.RL 132 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994); Aer-Aerotron, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public Transp.,
104 F.3d 677 (4th Cir. 1997).
34. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (when a state
engages in a federally regulated activity it subjects itself to federal regulation), overruled in part, Welch
v. State Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
35. S. Elizabeth Gibson, Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic Village: Amended
Section 106 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 323-25 (1995).
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possible for the TIB to bring avoidance actions under federal law in state
court.a6 She argues that where Congress clearly states an intention to make
states liable for money damages, that federal cause of action against the
states becomes the law of the state through the Supremacy Clause. As a
result, an action could be brought in state court even where the state has not
consented to suit. This argument turns on dicta in the Supreme Court's
decision in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission," where
the Supreme Court allowed a negligence action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act to go forward against a state owned railroad. The
Court stated that when Congress speaks with sufficient clarity "so that a
federal statute does impose liability upon the States the Supremacy Clause
makes that statute the law in every State, fully enforceable in state court.3a
In Seminole Tribe itself, however, the Supreme Court appeared to assume
that such state court litigation would be permitted only if the state
consented.39 So while the argument may currently be viable, it does not
appear likely that it will find favor with the Supreme Court as currently
constituted.
3. Privileges and Immunities
Third, one court has argued that a preference action is an incident of
citizenship within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore within Congress' power to create
private rights of action to enforce rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 As I noted above, when the Supreme Court decided
Seminole Tribe it simultaneously vacated and remanded a bankruptcy case
decided on the basis of Union Gas.4' Most courts that have looked at the
question have concluded that the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution is
not different from the Indian Commerce Clause for these purposes.42
36. S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 195 (1996).
37. 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
38. Id. at 206-07 (referring to Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1990)).
39. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.14 (1996). Hilton could be distinguished
on a number of grounds, particularly on the basis that a state owned instrumentality, such as a railroad,
is not the state for sovereign immunity purposes.
40. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
41. In re Merchants Grain Inc., 59 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1995).
42. See supra note 26.
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I. POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS-FEDERALIZING AvoIDANCE ACTIONS
A more profitable line of argument may lie in amending § 106 to
capitalize on the fact that Seminole Tribe and the doctrine of sovereign
immunity only bar actions by private citizens, not actions by the Federal
Government to enforce federal rights against the states.4a Thus, a number
of legislative strategies might be possible which would allow avoidance
actions to be brought against states. Whether an amendment will pass
muster under Seminole Tribe will turn on whether the actor bringing suit is
"federal enough."
One possibility might be to vest the power to bring preference actions
in the United States Trustee." The preference could be recovered by the
Federal Government, and a statute could be enacted providing for the return
of the proceeds of the action to the estate. While this strategy would
alleviate any Eleventh Amendment concerns (the suit would be commenced
and prosecuted by a federal official) it would place a significant burden and
expense on the Federal Government. A second, less burdensome mechanism
would be to allow the U.S. trustee to hire outside counsel, and deduct the
expenses from any recovery which would otherwise be payable to the estate.
A third stopping point along the spectrum would be to create a procedure
under which the TIB would be required to seek approval from the U.S.
Trustee before bringing an action against a state. A final and purely formal
stopping point, would be to enact a qui tam like statute, under which
Congress would simply authorize the TIB to bring an action in the name of
the United States.
M. FEDERALIZING AVOIDANCE ACTIONS-How FEDERAL IS FEDERAL
ENOUGH?
Having identified a number of ways around Seminole Tribe's ban on
private suits against states, it is necessary to decide which, if any of these
strategies pass constitutional muster. All of these strategies seek to solve the
43. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.1 4 ("the Federal Government can bring suit in federal
court against a State."); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892). See also Jonathan R.
Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV.
539 (1995).
44. It is important to distinguish the United States Trustee from the TIB. The TIB is a person,
usually a bankruptcy attorney, appointed by the Bankruptcy Court to administer the estate of a particular
debtor. The Office of the United States Trustee, by contrast, is an arm of the Department of Justice
charged with supervising pending bankruptcy cases. The U.S. Trustee is frequently responsible for
conducting the first meeting of creditors required under II U.S.C. § 341, for ensuring that creditors'




sovereign immunity problem by stamping an otherwise private action with
a "federal" imprimatur. The question is how closely the Court's future
sovereign immunity jurisprudence will scrutinize the label. Must the action
be brought by and prosecuted by federal officials? Might the legal work be
contracted out to private attorneys, with the expenses paid out of the
recovery? Might the action merely be approved by a federal official? May
Congress simply declare the private plaintiff a private attorney general?
One commentator argued, pre-Seminole Tribe, by analogy to the qui
tam statute, that Congress could give private citizens the power to litigate
in the name of the Federal Government.45 However, this purely formal
solution runs into two problems: One textual, one structural. First, the
Eleventh Amendment, by its terms, operates as a bar to any suit,
"commenced or prosecuted" by a citizen against a state. The "commenced
or prosecuted" language seems to require both that the decision to bring suit,
and control over its prosecution be retained by some federal official. One
response to this argument is that, after Hans, the Eleventh Amendment has
become sufficiently divorced from its text to allow for such novel solutions.
Whether it is likely to succeed will turn on whether the Eleveqth
Amendment is read as embodying a general principal of sovereign immunity
or whether the Court seeks to adhere to its text. Second, the core concept
of sovereign immunity within a federal structure imposes some constraint.
The distinction between citizen and federal suits would seem to embody a
judgment that within a federal system, there must be some decision made
by an accountable federal official to bring suit.46  Under Union Gas,
Congress satisfied that requirement. After Seminole Tribe, that official must
be executive. Congressional abrogation will not do.47
Based on this analysis, to satisfy Seminole Tribe, control over
avoidance litigation would have to remain with the U.S. Trustee or some
other executive official. The U.S. Trustee would be free to hire outside
45. Siegel, supra note 40.
46. Indeed, the rule in Seminole Tribe might be read as requiring a federal official to decide
whether a particular action is to go forward. By requiring the suit to be brought in the name of the
federal government, the doctrine allows the federal government to serve as a gatekeeper. A suit brought
by a private individual against a state to enforce a federal right may have costs to the federal government
in connection with the state/federal relationship. Indeed, the current debate over unfunded federal
mandates might be seen as a political backlash to federal interference with state prerogatives. Placing
the enforcement decision in the hands of unaccountable private citizens may exacerbate such disputes.
47. A third, related point is that, at least with regard to qui tam actions, the United States has an
interest in the outcome of the litigation. The qui tam plaintiff retains a percentage of the recovery, but
the U.S. retains the rest. The requirement of a financial interest would not seem to be essential, the
federal interest might equally plausibly derive from an important federal policy interest, such as the
implementation of the Constitutional Bankruptcy power.
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counsel to handle the action, and the costs of the litigation to be deducted
from any recovery. The remaining proceeds could then be paid over to the
bankruptcy estate. Under this approach, the intent of Congress in amending
§ 106 could be achieved with relatively little additional expense.
IV. SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS REMAIN
However, two potentially large practical stumbling blocks remain to
any proposed statutory solution which turns on action by the Federal
Government: Conflict of interest and prosecutorial discretion. First, the
United States has a conflict of interest. The United States is frequently a
claimant in bankruptcy cases. Giving the United States the power to
prosecute a claim which would otherwise have been a claim of the estate
gives leverage to the United States in its negotiations over its own claims.
For example, the U.S. Trustee might decline to bring avoidance actions
unless the United States is given a priority in any recoveries, or unless its
own claim is given a higher priority. A solution to this conflict of interest
problem would be to give the United States a lien on, and/or priority in any
avoidance recoveries against states.4" While this does not restore the law
to its status before Seminole Tribe it does eliminate any incentive for states
to engage in a race of diligence. Second, the U.S. Trustee might limit its
avoidance efforts to those necessary to satisfy the claims of the United
States. To avoid this any statutory solution ought to be drafted in a way
that curbs prosecutorial discretion by making it clear that the duty of the
U.S. Trustee or other federal official runs to the creditors of the estate. In
addition, the statute should require the bankruptcy court to approve any
settlement with a state after notice to creditors and a hearing.
V. CONCLUSION
Thus, while there are a number of litigating strategies available to ifhe
Trustee under current law which may allow the Trustee to bring avoidance
actions against states, it may be necessary to consider amending § 106 to
place litigating authority in the hands of federal officials. If this is done,
care must be taken in drafting a statute that will address the possibility of
conflict of interest and prosecutorial discretion.
48. Such a priority would also ease the path of the amendment through Congress.
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